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8
Singapore
Connecting Asian Markets with Global Finance
Karen P.Y. Lai
8.1 Introduction
Founded as a British trading colony in 1819, Singapore took its first substantive
steps towards becoming an international financial centre soon after independ-
ence from Malaysia in 1965. Today it is arguably the world’s fastest-growing
centre for private wealth management. A WealthInsight report (2013) predicts
that Singapore will overtake Switzerland to become the largest offshore wealth
centre by 2020. Singapore’s significance as an international financial centre
(IFC) has been evident since 1968with the formation of the Asian dollarmarket
(ADM). Since then, the financial services industry has grown both in terms of
size and scopewith currentlymore than 700financial institutions participating
in banking, fundmanagement, treasury operations, insurance, equity markets,
debt issuance, commodities trading, andmore. Over the years, the GDP contri-
bution of financial services has risen from 4.6 per cent in 1965 to 12.25 per cent
in2016 (see Figure 8.1). In termsof employment,finance and insurance services
employ 5.56 per cent of Singapore’s resident population in 2016; this figure
rises to 20.69 per cent if business services (which would count the finance and
insurance services asmajor clients) are included. Singapore now ranks amongst
the top IFCs in the world, behind only London and New York and generally on
a par with Hong Kong (Z/Yen Group 2017).
This chapter examines the emergence and contemporary development of
Singapore as an IFC by investigating the multiscalar processes of financial
markets and activities. Taking a financial geography perspective, financial
markets and actors are understood as being firmly rooted in IFCs as the
physical locations where the production and exchange of financial services
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takeplace.Markets are not just abstractions that exist ‘out there’ andoperated by
‘invisible hands’; they are spatially embedded and socially constructed. While
finance appears to be global in operations and impacts, the location of financial
activities, i.e. the ‘capitals of capital’ (Cassis 2010), is crucial in explaining and
understandingfinancialmarkets, products and services. In this vein, this chapter
unravels the spatial and temporal dynamics that have influenced the develop-
ment offinancialmarkets and activities to account for the rise of Singapore as an
IFC, and highlights some contemporary challenges and future growth sectors,
particularly those arising in the ten years following the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis. Someportions of the analysiswill also reflect on the preceding 1997Asian
financial crisis, as industry changes and policy response back then set the stage
for subsequent industry shifts and have shaped the responses and impacts of
firms, regulators, and consumers following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
Singapore’s significance as an IFC is often traced to the late 1960s when the
government made a strategic decision to develop the ADM in 1968. Albert
Winsemius, a Dutch economic adviser to the then prime minister Lee Kuan
Yew, contacted an official at the Bank of America in London for advice on
setting up a financial centre, specifically regarding an offshore ‘Eurodollar’
financial market for Asia to be based in Singapore (Woo 2016). The rapid
expansion of the Eurodollar market during that time created demands for an
Asian location to broaden the time zone coverage.With special regulatory and
tax treatment for commercial banks to set up separate Asian Currency Units
(ACUs) in their Singapore banking operations, the Asian dollar business
mushroomed, focusing mainly on South Asian business and buoyed by large
US dollar spending in the region during the Vietnam War. Singapore thus
acquired a first-mover advantage over Hong Kong, which was also developing
an ADM at the same time (Emery 1975). The establishment of the Monetary









































Finance & Insurance Business Services Combined Value
Figure 8.1. Contribution of financial services sector to Singapore’s GDP, 1965–2016
Source: Author based on data from the Singapore Department of Statistics.
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central bank and finance regulator. The flotation of the Singapore dollar in
1973 fuelled the development of foreign exchange (FX) products and transac-
tions. The 1970s and 1980s saw the establishment of new financial markets in
equities, derivatives, and commodities, while fund management, corporate
financing, and insurance sectors become more prominent from the 1990s
onwards (Tan 2005).
The rest of this chapter will discuss the major developments in Singapore’s
financial sectors and markets and how they are reshaping Singapore’s IFC
status in terms of domestic shifts, regional role, and global networks.
Section 8.2 details the changing regulatory environment in terms of banking
liberalization and its impact on the growing banking sector and financial
consumption in Singapore. Section 8.3 focuses on selected financial markets
that have become increasingly prominent over the past decade, namely
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) and the offshore renminbi (RMB). Finally,
amidst new disruptive technologies and new financial actors in the global
system, the emergence of fintech and its growing importance for Singapore’s
role as an IFC is considered in Section 8.4. The chapter concludes with some
forward-looking remarks regarding Singapore’s outlook as a premier financial
hub in Asia and the long-standing debate regarding competition with Hong
Kong for this accolade.
8.2 Regulatory Shifts and Liberalization
Since the 1990s, substantial regulatory attention in Singapore has been dir-
ected at liberalizing financial markets and banking sectors to attract more
international financial institutions, covering market segments such as fund
management, treasury operations, insurance, the equity market, debt issu-
ance, and corporate financing. The internationalization of the finance sector
in Singapore was a strategic shift that was mooted following the 1985 eco-
nomic recession and more actively implemented after the 1997 Asian finan-
cial crisis. Special committee reports commissioned following those two crises
were aimed at assessing the state of the economy and highlighting future
growth sectors; the financial services industry featured prominently and con-
sistently in all recommendations. The responses by the Singaporean govern-
ment to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, in particular, reconfigured the
structure of the Singaporean banking system in ways that shaped the impacts
of and responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and subsequent develop-
ments in banking and financial markets in Singapore.
In 1985 Singapore faced its first economic recession and its first government
deficit since independence due to depressed demand for manufactured goods
and the petro-dollar debt crisis. A review by the Sub-Committee on Banking
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and Financial Services (1985)1 highlighted the desirability of deregulation
(with particular reference to the United States, UK, Japan, and Australia) for
creating greater efficiency, while the securitization of debt and the integration
of loan and capital markets were regarded as favourable and necessary in order
to develop deep capital markets and a fully-fledged IFC. The report also called
for the MAS to ‘take on a more developmental role’ (Sub-Committee on
Banking and Financial Services 1985, p. iv), like that of the Economic Devel-
opment Board,2 in order to boost the financial services industry and to con-
tribute to long-term economic growth. This marked a distinctive role for the
finance sector in terms of Singapore’s economic development, and a departure
from Singapore’s export-led manufacturing strategy that had prevailed since
the 1970s (see Rodan 1989). From that point onwards, the MAS also took on a
distinctive promotional role for Singapore’s banking and finance sector in
addition to its regulatory function.
The focus on banking and finance as a key pillar of growth re-emerged in
the 1998 report of the Sub-committee on Banking and Finance following
the Asian financial crisis (Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness 1998).
Singapore’s GDP had experienced an even sharper decline than during the 1985
recession (see Figure 8.2). The 1997 Asian financial crisis shook the banking
systems of Asian economies and the confidence of foreign investors and
domestic enterprises in Asia (Arndt and Hill 1999). Although Singapore was
among those least affected in Asia, the contagion effects from Asian neigh-
bours meant that weak incomes, restricted bank liquidity, labour retrench-
ment, and reduced regional trade culminated in Singapore’s second economic
recession since independence. Alongside economic stimulation measures
such as higher tax rebates and increased public expenditure, recommenda-
tions of strategic sectors for government-led investment included advanced
engineering, chemicals, and aerospace industries but also highlighted a broad
swathe of financial sectors (Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness
1998). Areas such as fund management, risk management, equity markets,
debt insurance, corporate finance, insurance and reinsurance, and cross-
border banking, were identified as strategic for developing the international
capacities of Singapore as a financial centre.
The change in spatial framing is significant as these sectors targeted for
growth would expand the economic and financial space of Singapore well
beyond its national space-economy into regional and global financial net-
works. The regionalization policy was meant to develop an ‘external wing’
1 Part of the ad hoc Economic Committee set up for post-crisis recovery and policy
recommendations.
2 The Economic Development Board is a statutory board that coordinates the industrial policy of
the Singaporean government and acts a promotional agent to facilitate foreign direct investment
into Singapore.
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and overcome the limitations of Singapore’s small domestic economy through
the overseas expansion of domestic firms and establishment of industrial parks
in other Asian countries (Yeung 1999). The regionalization of domestic firms
included a plan for banks not only to facilitate the regionalization of manu-
facturing and other service firms but also to become wealth-creating enter-
prises in their own right. The rest of this section therefore focuses on the
liberalization and regulatory changes specific to banking in order to examine
their impacts on the changing roles of banking firms, new actors in themarket,
and changing consumer practices within the broader reframing of finance in
Singapore’s economy and society.
8.2.1 Banking Liberalization
The transformation of the local banking industry into a robust globally
oriented financial services industry was a developmental goal deemed vital to
Singapore’s long-term competitiveness and economic success. This involved
substantial reorganizationof thebusinesses fromtraditional loan intermediation
into financial services corporations embedded in capital markets. This move
also reflects wider trends in global banking since the 1980s whereby banking




















































































































Figure 8.2. Singapore’s annual GDP, 1965–2016
Source: Author, based on data from the Singapore Department of Statistics.
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banking to fee-based banking for both retail and investment banks. Sources of
funds for banks have also changed from traditional loan intermediation to
more securitized modes in order to fuel business segments and geographical
expansion. Official speeches during the early 2000s emphasized the growing
role of non-bank capital to complement bank financing as means by which
Singaporean banks could position themselves in the region. This shift from
‘bank-based finance’ to ‘market-based banking’ was seen as the way forward
for Singaporean banks to grow and become substantial enough for regional
leadership and global competition.
The liberalization programme started shortly after Singapore joined the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) in 1996, which was then followed by mem-
bership on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2009.While
Singaporewas reconfiguring its roleon international regulatoryplatforms, it also
had to find solutions for buildingmore robust financial institutions in the wake
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. A key policy shift was towards a more con-
sultative ‘risk-based’ model of regulation rather than the previous ‘one size fits
all’ supervisory approach, which was in line with Basel II requirements (Ong
2004). This enabled individual firms to exercise greater freedom in expanding
intonewmarkets and sectors but also required them toput in place internal risk-
control measures that comply with broader regulatory guidelines (such as min-
imum capital ratios, reporting requirements, etc.) (Hamilton-Hart 2002). This
explains the subsequent changes in banking ownership, business strategies, and
corporate governance that swept through the industry in what became known
as Singapore’s ‘Big Bang’3 in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Ngiam 2011).
Therefore, while debates following the 2008 financial crisis have high-
lighted the systemic risks to national economies and global finance presented
by banks that are deemed ‘too big to fail’, this was not the case two decades ago
in Singapore. Instead, banks were challenged to grow bigger in order to extend
their extraterritorial reach and secure long-term competitiveness, not only for
themselves as business entities but also to strengthen the banking sector and
financial centre status of Singapore. A series of banking liberalizationmeasures
was implemented during a five-year period from 1999 to 2004, which had the
dual impact of increasing the number of foreign banks in Singapore (which
were permitted to engage in a wider range of financial activities) and the
consolidation of local banks into just three large entities. These ‘Big Bang’
reforms in Singapore included issuing a new category of Qualifying Full Bank
(QFB) licences to encourage foreign banking presence, increasing the number
of restricted banks, giving offshore banks greater flexibility in Singapore dollar
3 The use of the term ‘Big Bang’ reform by Singaporean authorities and policymakers is
particularly evocative of the deregulation of financial markets that swept through the City of
London in the 1980s.
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wholesale business, and lifting the 40 per cent foreign shareholding limit in
local banks. All these created competitive pressures on local banks in securing
domestic and regional market positions. As pointed out by then deputy prime
minister Lee Hsien Loong (Lee 1998):
Size matters in international banking . . . [The local banks] need to grow large
enough to enjoy the economics of scale, and to have the reach and resilience to
go regional, and eventually make a mark in global markets. This is why MAS has
encouraged local banks to consider mergers.
The sale of Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) to Development Bank of Singapore
(DBS) (both state-owned at that time) by the Singapore government in 1998
also made headlines as it made DBS the largest bank in Singapore and sent a
clear message to the industry regarding a push towards consolidation in the
local banking sector. These competitive pressures and state signals pushed the
other local banks into seekingmergers and acquisitions.When the dust settled
in 2002, only three large local banks were left—DBS, United Overseas Bank
(UOB), and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC).
Other than bank mergers, the banking liberalization policies also included
divestment requirements and changes in corporate governance. The consoli-
dation andmerger of local banks significantly increased deposit bases, deemed
vital by the state for promoting extra-territorial competitiveness. The enlarged
banks were also supposed to expand their non-deposit-taking business, trans-
forming themselves from traditional banks into more complex financial insti-
tutions offering an extensive and sophisticated array of products and services
to an expanded regional and global customer base. In 2000, local banks were
required to divest themselves of their non-financial businesses and unwind
cross-shareholdings within three years. This not only complied with Basel II
requirements, but also allowed local banks to rebuild their financial position
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Rules regarding the management of
financial and non-financial divisions of banking firms and limitations on
cross-shareholding structures also reshaped corporate governance and man-
agement structures, especially for formerly family-owned banks (Lai and
Daniels 2017).
These liberalization measures, regulatory changes, and increased competi-
tion in the banking sector prompted significant shifts in business strategies
for many banks. New bank licensing schemes enabled more foreign banks to
engage in a wider range of banking activities, strengthened their product
offering and capabilities in Singapore, and created a stronger commercial and
retail banking sector. On the other hand, after mergers and business restructur-
ing, the three local banks shifted from traditional loan intermediation into
financial services embedded in capital markets, especially in the areas of equity
and debt issuance, mergers and acquisitions, asset management, and advisory
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services. The outcome has been an overall push towards securitization as well
as increased emphasis on consumer markets for fee-based activities. This
emphasis on consumer markets is particularly strategic given the increasing
affluence of the domestic population and particularly growing wealth in the
region (e.g. in Indonesia, Thailand, China, and India), both of which have
significantly increased demands for financial products and services over the
past two decades. This emphasis on developing Singapore as a premier
wealth management centre in Asia is reflected in the launch in April 2011
of the Private Banking Code of Conduct, aimed at enhancing the compe-
tency of private banking professionals and fostering high market conduct
standards (Menon 2011).
8.2.2 Changing Financial Consumption
The development of Singapore as an IFC involved not only banking firms and
regulatory bodies but also everyday consumers. Banking liberalization since
1999 has led to greater participation of foreign banks and increased competi-
tion in the domestic market. In response, local banks (as well as foreign banks
with QFB status) started to diversify their product offerings aimed at the
growingmiddle class in Singapore and the region. Banks shifted their business
focus towards fee-paying activities in addition to deposits and loans services,
especially in the area of unit trusts and investment solutions either through
the banks’ own asset management divisions or joint development with other
financial institutions. During this same period, the Central Provident Fund
(a national compulsory savings scheme for pensions)4 was liberalized in the
1990s, which allowed members to use portions of their pension savings to
invest in commercial funds for potentially higher yields (Lai 2013). This was
also part of the strategic plan following the 1985 economic recession and
the 1997 Asian financial crisis to develop the wealth management sector in
Singapore and boost its IFC capabilities (Tan 2011). Even as domestic banks
have transformed themselves from banking firms (focusing on traditional
loan intermediation) to more complex financial services corporations (with
greater engagement with securities and derivatives markets, and enlargement
of non-bank financial investments in insurance and asset management),
households and individuals have also increasingly been exhorted to be self-
reliant and ‘responsible’ in taking care of their financial futures and, as a result,
4 The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a mandatory state-run savings scheme for all working
Singaporean citizens and permanent residents, with a portion of gross monthly salary being
transferred to individuals’ CPF accounts by both employers and employees. Withdrawal can only
be made for retirement needs, public housing, medical care, tertiary education, and, since the
1990s, approved investment products.
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generate demand for insurance and investment products (Lai 2018). In this
way, financial consumers not only perform the role of self-reliant and discip-
lined subjects responsible for their own financial future (see Langley 2006),
but are also framed as citizen subjects who would build a stronger and more
competitive national economy through their changing financial practices.
The changing role of consumers in Singapore’s financial-centre aspirations
is reflected in the organizational change and business strategies of POSB (Lai
and Tan 2016). POSB had humble beginnings as a public savings bank with
strong social objectives of encouraging principles of saving and thrift, and
providing home loans for public housing ownership. After its acquisition by
the government-backed DBS bank as part of consolidation and regional
expansion plans, POSB underwent a distinctive makeover into a profit-based
and fee-driven financial institution. Whereas POSB advertisements used to
encouraged savings and thrift, with special tax-free incentives for savings
accounts, school visits, public campaigns, and televised lottery draws to
encourage high savings rates, advertisements over the past decade have turned
towards a model of financial investment whereby anyone could drop into
their ‘neighbourhood bank’ and invest in blue-chip companies. The appeal to
social memories and extensive neighbourhood branch networks of POSB has
been instrumental to DBS’s business strategy in marketing a growing range of
insurance and investment products. The enlarged DBS recorded a dramatic
increase in sales of investment- and insurance-related products mainly due to
referrals from the POSB customer base (Tan 2002). DBS annual reports showed
that total sales of wealth management and investment-related products sky-
rocketed between 1998 and 2003 (see Figure 8.3). A similar trend could also be
observed in the business orientation of other Singaporean banks during this
period (Lai and Daniels 2017).
This emphasis on investment and fee-paying activities became problematic
during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. While the financial crisis had limited
systemic impact on the banking sector in Singapore, the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers on 15 September 2008 led to the default or early redemption of
several credit-linked structured notes (collectively known as Minibonds) that
had Lehman Brothers as a swap guarantor or reference entity. The affected
products included Minibond Notes issued by Lehman Brothers, High Notes 5
from the DBS, Jubilee Notes from Merrill Lynch, and Pinnacle Notes from
Morgan Stanley. The Minibonds were distributed by ten financial institutions
in Singapore, including a number of domestic banks and their securities
subsidiaries (see Table 8.1). Almost 10,000 investors were affected; a signifi-
cant portion of themwere either retired, elderly, or middle-aged individuals in
late-working life who had invested most or all of their life savings (Lai 2013).
The impact of financial losses and accusations of misconduct by distributors
prompted public outrage and a level of social activism uncommon in
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Singapore with public rallies and signed petitions to the MAS for strong action
against the distributors. Accusations of banks targeting and mis-selling to
retirees became a common theme of discussion, alongside poor documenta-
tion and explanation of product features and risks to investors. Findings from
the MAS investigation (MAS 2009) regarding banks’ due diligence on Notes,
sales procedures, assessment of customers’ risk profiles, and training and
supervision of financial representatives supported media reports of negligence
and misconduct. Distributors did not fully understand the nature of the
Minibonds, bank representatives were inadequately trained on the products,
there were inconsistencies in how products were matched to customers’ risk
profiles, and wrong information was given to investors. As a penalty, all ten
distributors were banned from selling structured notes for periods ranging











1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Millions (S$)
Figure 8.3. DBS bank’s increased sales of investment products (excluding bancassur-
ance) following the acquisition of POSB
Source: Author, based on data from DBS Annual Reports, 1998–2004.
Table 8.1. Distributors of Lehman Minibonds in
Singapore
1. ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Singapore Branch1
2. DBS Bank Ltd1
3. Malayan Banking Berhad Singapore Branch1
4. Hong Leong Finance
5. CIMB-GK Securities Pte Ltd
6. DMG & Partners Securities Pte Ltd
7. Kim Eng Securities Pte Ltd
8. OCBC Securities Pte Ltd2
9. Phillip Securities Pte Ltd
10. UOB Kay Hian Pte Ltd2
1 Retail banks
2 Securities arms of Singapore retail banks
Source: Author, based on data from MAS (2009).
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Following this event, MAS regulatory reviews and policy revisions led to
changes in operational requirements of banks, including improving informa-
tion disclosure through compulsory product highlight sheets, new assessment
frameworks for matching customers’ risk profile, and improving the training
of bank representatives. Regulatory frameworks were further refined through
amendments to the Securities and Futures Act, Financial Advisers Act, and a
Financial Advisory Industry Review (aptly dubbed ‘FAIR’) aimed at improving
the quality of financial advice to retail investors (Financial Advisory Industry
Review 2013; MAS 2012). These regulatory changes provide more safeguards
for retail investors and closer supervision of securities business in retail banks
to ensure due diligence and fair disclosure in the sales and advisory process.
These are seen as particularly important steps to safeguard the integrity and
reputation of Singapore’s financial regulation, especially given the focus on
wealth management and high net worth clientele in Singapore and the wider
Asia region (WealthInsight 2013).
8.3 New Financial Markets
Over the past decade, Singapore has also actively developed new financial
markets to cater to demands from different geographical and market seg-
ments. Two of the most significant developments in terms of market partici-
pation and government involvement are Islamic banking and finance (IBF)
and the offshore RMBmarket. Both of these have been positioned by the MAS
as part of a broader government strategy to foster financial innovation for
building a broad-based IFC.
8.3.1 Islamic Banking and Finance
Islamic banking and finance (IBF) had a slow start in Singapore in the 1990s
and picked up momentum in the early 2000s with increasing investment
flows between the Middle East and the growing economies of Asia. IBF is a
form of banking and finance rooted in Sharia law. A key characteristic relates
to certain prohibitions such as the injunctions against riba (interest), gharar
(excessive risk, uncertainty), maysir (gambling), and ‘making money from
money’ (e.g. currency speculation or financial derivatives). IBF covers a range
of products and services from deposit accounts and project financing to
insurance (takaful) and Islamic bonds (sukuk). The ideal forms of transactions
are rooted in ‘equity-financing’ or ‘profit-sharing’ (respectively musharaka
and mudarabah), but a dominant form of contract remains cost-plus finan-
cing (murabaha). Whether a certain product or service is deemed Islamically
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acceptable depends on the interpretation of Sharia scholars of a given Sharia
Supervisory Board (Bassens 2012).5
A handful of takaful products were launched in Singapore in the 1990s, with
support from government-owned banks and insurance cooperatives, as test
cases to gauge the market (AMPRO Holdings 1995). The interest in IBF prod-
ucts proved rather limited amongst both Muslim and non-Muslim financial
consumers, owing to a general lack of awareness about them, and the govern-
ment took a back seat to observe how the IBF market might develop organic-
ally (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997). This started to change in the early
2000s with growing potential for increased trade and financial ties with the
Middle East. With a smaller domestic market for IBF compared to neighbour-
ing Malaysia and Indonesia, the focus has been on leveraging the infrastruc-
ture currently in place to offer wholesale market activities in the areas of
capital market activities and wealth management, and persuading financial
institutions to add IBF products and services to their existing suite of activities
(Lai and Samers 2017).
Since the early 2000s, the MAS has become particularly active in the devel-
opment of IBF in Singapore through regulatory reviews, greater participation
in international bodies and, later on, tax incentives for IBF products (Vernados
2012). As a prudential regulator, the MAS does not prescribe what constitutes
Sharia compliance nor endorse specific Sharia rulings; the responsibility lies
with Islamic banks (or conventional banks offering IBF products) to take into
account Sharia compliance and to manage this compliance risk as part of their
overall riskmanagement process, since they would be generally exposed to the
same types of risk, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risks, with
many similar prudential and supervisory issues as conventional banks. Fold-
ing IBF within a common regulatory framework allows for greater flexibility in
financial innovation and future market development, as it keeps the doors
open for potential intersections between Islamic and conventional finance in
terms of financial expertise, business reorganization, and potential investors.
Subsequent years saw accelerated regulatory developments in opening up
greater scope for IBF activities in Singapore (Heng 2009). Other than remitting
additional stamp duties and opening up murabahah financing, the MAS also
joined the Kuala Lumpur-based Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) as a full
member in 2005, after two years as an observer. Through active participation
in the various working groups and task forces in areas such as supervisory
review, Islamic money markets, capital adequacy, liquidity management, and
solvency requirements for takaful operations, the MAS acquired technical
5 Many of these Sharia scholars are based in theMiddle East, althoughMalaysia is also developing
significant capacities in Sharia interpretation and governance (see Lai and Samers 2017).
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knowledge and built professional networks within the international IBF com-
munity (MAS 2011). At the same time, Singapore’s experience with global
financial governance bodies is advantageous as developing IBF regulatory
expertise could be combined with the MAS’s experience in other international
regulatory working committees such as the Bank for International Settlements,
International Organization of Securities Commissions, and International Asso-
ciation of Insurance Supervisors (Ong 2005). In 2006–8, another series of tax
policies was implemented to boost the IBF market, such as tax clarification on
murabaha financing and sukuk, which gave participants the same regulatory
protection under Singapore’s Bank Act as conventional depositors. Further tax
concessions were granted on qualifying Sharia-compliant financial activities
(e.g. lending, fund management, insurance and reinsurance).
While the 2008 Global Financial Crisis led to a credit crunch that reverber-
ated through global financial markets, particularly in the United States and
Europe, the IBF sector remained relatively strong and has been growing at
double-digit rates over the past decade (Bin Ghalaita 2015). With different
business models and guiding principles for investments, IBF appears to be
more resilient during financial crises compared to conventional financial insti-
tutions (Hasan andDridi 2010). This is also reflected in the buoyant activities in
Singapore’s IBF sector, particularly as new regulations in 2009 permit banks to
conduct an even wider range of new IBF activities (e.g. murabaha interbank
placements, ijara, and spot murabaha), which sends clear signals to market
participants concerning financial innovation. Cross-border financing has also
become particularly prominent over the past decade, particularly in terms of
sukuk (insurance) and Sharia-compliant REITs, leveraging existing financial
infrastructure and expertise in Singapore. Issue managers of sukuk from
Pakistan and the Malaysian state of Sarawak have held road shows in Singa-
pore to reach out to the established pool of institutional investors. Building
on the critical mass of reinsurers based in Singapore is also deemed beneficial
for takaful participants seeking to collaborate with reinsurers in Singapore to
provide retakaful capacity. In 2009, the MAS even backed a sukuk facility in
Singapore (the first suchmove by a conventional central bank) by issuing sukuk
to be priced against the liquid Singapore Government Securities market, which
then provided a transparent price discovery mechanism and also improved
stability and confidence in a new financial market. The encouragement of
financial innovation has also led to the issue of RMB-denominated sukuk,
such the RMB 1 billion (US$158.06 million) sukuk Wakalah by the Axiata
Group, which was then the largest yuan-denominated sukuk issued. The listing
in RMB denomination was also aligned with Singapore’s growing status as an
offshore RMB centre for trading and settlement (Islamic Finance News 2014).
Singapore has an established role as the largest REITs market in Asia outside
Japan and is expected to capitalize on that expertise to dominate the Islamic
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REITs market even ahead of larger IBF markets such as Malaysia (Saeed 2011,
Suhana et al. 2012).
Listing these sukuk and Islamic REITs products in Singapore enables issuers
from both within and outside of Singapore to capitalize on a wide range of
existing expertise such as legal, accounting, and financial knowledge for the
creation of special purpose vehicles, and to tap into potential investors who
tend to cluster in an established IFC. While increasing trade with the Middle
East provided initial strategic reasons for developing IBF in Singapore, the
appeal of this emerging financial sector is also set against the growing interest
of investors based within and outside of Singapore in various forms of ethical
investment (Šoštaric 2015). The orientation for the IBF market in Singapore
is distinctively outward-looking, with the objective of building up IBF activ-
ities alongside existing financial market segments and the attraction of both
Muslim and non-Muslim investors.
While there has been significant development in IBF in Singapore particu-
larly over the past decade, the Singapore market still has relatively few Islamic
financial institutions (especially in comparison with neighbouringMalaysia),
in terms of conventional banks offering IBF services.6 It also suffers from the
lack of a domestic market, with no Islamic pension funds and little business
demand for Sharia-compliant financial vehicles. Although Singapore seems
to lack a critical mass of IBF expertise, institutions, products, and investors,
the MAS is banking on a wider neo-liberal strategy that has driven its inter-
national financial centre development, which is to create more diverse finan-
cial sectors and deeper capital markets within a regulatory climate that
welcomes financial innovation and new financial institutions. The enmesh-
ing of global financial networks, national economic development strategies,
and Islamically-inflected modes of market making (see Lai and Samers 2017)
therefore continues to unfold in the formation of a small but distinct IBF
market in Singapore.
8.3.2 The Offshore RMB Market
Following from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the fiscal and current
account woes in the United States, the Eurozone economic crisis, and the
long-term stagnation of the Japanese economy have all highlighted the prob-
lems associated with the world’s traditional reserve currencies: the US dollar,
the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen. China’s rising global power
6 There was a full-fledged Islamic Bank in Singapore but the Islamic Bank of Asia announced in
September 2015 that it will be closing over the next 2–3 years and transferring its business over to
its majority shareholder DBS bank, which will continue to operate an IBF ‘window’. HSBC has also
closed its Islamic banking divisions in Singapore in 2013 as part of its global consolidation of
Islamic banking business.
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since the end of the twentieth century is also hinting at an increasingly
multipolar world and fuelling speculations regarding the renminbi (RMB) as
a global alternative to the US dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency.
However, RMB international recognition and usage has only begun to gain
traction recently due to the slow and limited liberalization of the currency.
China came out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed, which
reinforced the Chinese government’s view that a liberalization of its foreign
exchange regime and capital markets could introduce too much instability
and uncertainty in the longer term. The internationalization of the RMB has
therefore been very gradual, building on the wider economic reforms of China
under the Open Door Policy of 1978 and China’s membership of the World
Trade Organization since 2001. This gradual and managed process of capital
account liberalization, alongside the maintenance of exchange rate controls,
has resulted in a distinct separation between onshore RMB markets (in which
controls on interest and exchange rates remain), and the more liberalized
component of offshore RMB markets (He and McCauley 2010).
An offshore RMB centre is a financial hub outside of China that conducts
a variety of RMB-denominated financial transactions. Hong Kong was
appointed as the first offshore RMB centre due to its special status within the
Chinese polity and its historical role as a gateway between mainland China
and global capital. Yuan-denominated7 transactions started in 2003 with per-
sonal banking services, followed by bonds and equities over the past decade.
Other major IFCs followed, such as London and Singapore, as well as smaller
financial centres such as Taiwan, Luxembourg, and Toronto. Singapore was
amongst the first to be selected for offshore RMB centre status after Hong
Kong. This builds on long-standing trade, FDI, and diplomatic relationships
between Singapore and China, which then turned towards financial cooper-
ation and linkages over the past decade under the China–Singapore Free Trade
Agreement (MAS 2017a). Six out of the top ten Chinese banks now operate in
Singapore, with Bank of China (BOC) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC) having QFB status, using Singapore as a hub for southeast Asian
markets. At the policy level, close discussions between the MAS and People’s
Bank of China (PBOC) led to the launch of RMB currency products and
services in Singapore. On 8 February 2013, PBOC appointed the Singapore
branch of ICBC as the RMB clearing bank in Singapore. On 27May 2013, ICBC
started RMB clearing services in Singapore, with fifty-three transactions valued
at more than 1.6 billion yuan (US$240million), and opened clearing accounts
for forty-nine banks during its first clearing day (Wang 2013). This was swiftly
followed by the MAS opening its representative office in Beijing (the first in
7 China’s currency is officially called the renminbi (RMB). The yuan is the unit of account.
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Asia) one day later. Within the first month of the launch of clearing services,
four banks issued a total of 2.5 billion yuan of RMB-denominated bonds in
Singapore (also known as ‘Lion City’ bonds).
In October 2013, China announced a further suite of measures to promote
the internationalization of RMB through Singapore, including granting of an
RMB qualified foreign institutional investor (RQFII) quota to Singapore (which
allows foreign investors to invest inmainlandChina’s bond and equitymarkets)
and listing Singapore as an investment destination under the RMB qualified
domestic institutional investor (RQDII) scheme (whichpermitsqualifieddomes-
tic Chinese investors to purchase overseas RMB-denominated products) (see
Table 8.2). The strong utilization of the RQFII quota in Singapore and positive
outlook led to the doubling of Singapore’s quota from 50 billion to 100 billion
yuan in 2016 (see Figure 8.4). Direct currency trading between the yuan and the
Singapore dollar also commenced on28October 2014 (Today 2014), with a daily
SGD–CNY benchmark published by the PBOC, which is expected to promote
Table 8.2. Approved RQFII quota list in Singapore, February 2017
RQFII Name SAFE ApprovalDate Accumulative Quota
(RMB 100 million)
Fullerton Fund Management Company Ltd 30/06/2014 12.00
NIKKO Asset Management Asia Limited 30/06/2014 10.00
APS Asset Management Pte Ltd 26/08/2014 15.00
New Silk Road Investment Pte Ltd 26/08/2014 15.00
Aberdeen Asset Management Asia Limited 28/11/2016 73.00
DBS Bank Limited 30/10/2014 30.00
Lion Global Investors Ltd 27/11/2014 10.00
The Bank of Nova Scotia Asia Limited 30/01/2015 15.00
Schroder Investment Management (Singapore) Ltd 30/01/2015 10.00
KKR Singapore Pte Ltd 26/03/2015 35.00
JPMorgan Asset Management (Singapore) Limited 26/03/2015 20.00
Neuberger Berman Singapore Pte Limited 26/03/2015 8.00
Aviva Investors Asia Pte Limited 28/04/2015 10.00
Target Asset Management Pte Ltd 28/04/2015 2.00
UOB Asset Management Ltd 28/04/2015 12.00
GIC Private Limited 28/04/2015 50.00
CSAM Asset Management Pte Ltd 29/05/2015 7.00
Allianz Global Investors Singapore Limited 29/05/2015 10.00
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited 29/06/2015 10.00
Amundi Singapore Limited 29/10/2015 28.00
UBS Asset Management (Singapore) Ltd 28/04/2016 25.00
BlackRock (Singapore) Limited 30/05/2016 200.00
Avanda Investment Management Pte Ltd 30/05/2016 7.00
PIMCO Asia Pte Ltd 29/06/2016 18.00
Phillip Capital Management (S) Ltd 27/07/2015 4.20
ST Asset Management Ltd 30/08/2016 6.50
Harveston Asset Management Pte Ltd 27/10/2016 6.50
Soochow Securities CSSD (Singapore) Pte Ltd 28/11/2016 15.00
Total approved quota under Singapore RQFII scheme 664.20
Source: Author, based on data from HSBC Securities Services, 2017
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transparency, lower foreign exchange transaction costs and improve the cur-
rency risk environment. This development should also boost the appeal of
offshore RMB in the region, given Singapore’s role as a financial centre and the
increased trade and investment linkages between ASEAN and China (IE
Singapore 2013). Another distinctive feature of the offshore RMB market in
Singapore is its connections to wider Singapore–China economic projects. The
measures to allow cross-border flows between Singapore and two industrial parks
in China (the Suzhou Industrial Park and Tianjin Ecocity, which are joint ven-
tures between Singaporean and Chinese companies and governments) is unique
to Singapore (IE Singapore 2013). This will allow companies operating in the two
business parks to raiseworking capital inRMBdirectly fromSingapore, and create
a cheaper funding environment for businesses with lower interest rates.
These milestones constitute significant steps towards future RMB trading
and settlement activities in Singapore, particularly given the rapid progress
achieved over a short time frame, and signal Singapore’s commitment to the
internationalization of the RMB. The commitment towards economic and
financial cooperation between Singapore and China is also evident in the
MAS’s continuing relationships with key banking, securities, and insurance




















Figure 8.4. Allocated RQFII in approved markets, as of December 2016 (in RMB billion)
Source: Author, based on data from HSBC Securities Services (2017).
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regulators in China, with annual meetings to exchange views on regulatory
cooperation and market development (Shanmugaratnam 2013). Thus far,
Singapore consistently ranks amongst the two largest RMB transaction centres
after Hong Kong, and overtook London in 2014 as the number one offshore
RMB centre after Hong Kong (ASIFMA 2014).
The IMF announced in November 2015 that it would include the RMB in
the Special Drawing Rights currency basket, marking a key milestone in RMB
internationalization. The use of the RMB has increased significantly over
the past few years, not only in cross-border transactions with mainland
China but also in offshore market activities. As mainland China’s economy
grows and becomes even more globally integrated, the RMB will be more
widely used internationally and mainland China’s capital account liberaliza-
tion is expected to continue. Within this context, Singapore’s early move in
establishing itself as an offshore RMB centre is strengthening its position as a
regional financial hub. Given the close bilateral ties between the two countries
and the continued growth of the Chinese economy during a time when other
Asian economies are also moving up the curve of development, Singapore is
well placed to leverage its financial expertise and hub status in furthering the
internationalization of the RMB. This development of RMB trading and settle-
ment in Singapore will in turn have significant impact on Singapore’s future
IFC development. This is particularly important as traditional financial ser-
vices such as foreign exchange trading and capital market activities have
declined in volume and significance in global financial markets, marking a
need for new engines of growth and to develop distinctive competencies in
new or emerging financial markets and services.
8.4 Fintech
Fintech, a shorthand for ‘financial technology’, has been making waves in the
headlines recently, particularly in terms of its potential to severely disrupt the
landscape of not just banking but also a range of financial institutions, inter-
mediaries, and technology and e-commerce companies (Bassens et al. 2017,
Economist 2015). Fintech encompasses a new wave of companies who are
developing products, systems, and platforms to change the way businesses
and consumers make payments, lend, borrow, and invest. The most disrupted
sectors, or at least most frequently highlighted in the news, are payments
and fund transfers, crowdfunding, and peer-to-peer lending. Between 2013
and 2014 alone, global investment in fintech ventures tripled from US$4.05
billion to US$12.21 billion, outstripping the growth in overall venture capital
investments (Accenture 2015). While there are ongoing debates about
whether the future of financial services would be characterized by ruptures
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(due to displacement or obsolescence) or redistribution (as existing players
grow and enrich the market or simply acquire new fintech firms and tech-
nologies), fintech is embraced in Singapore as yet another opportunity for
capturing new market trends and developing new capabilities that would
bolster Singapore’s IFC status.
On 27 July 2015, the MAS announced the formation of a FinTech and
Innovation Group (FTIG) that would be formally responsible for regulatory
policies and developmental strategies to encourage the use of innovative
technology in ways that would better manage risks, enhance efficiency, and
strengthen competitiveness in the financial sector. This move came together
with the appointment of a Chief FinTech Officer to lead the FTIG, a high-
profile position that signalled a clear commitment to developing and harness-
ing the potential of fintech for Singapore’s financial services industry. As
highlighted by the Managing Director of MAS:
The formation of FTIG is a serious commitment byMAS towards our vision of Smart
Financial Centre, where technology is applied pervasively to create new opportun-
ities and improve people’s lives. [The Chief FinTech Officer] and his team will work
closelywith thefinancial industry and technology community to promote a culture
of innovation in the industry while ensuring safety and security. (MAS 2015)
In addition, a FinTech Office was established on 3 May 2016 to serve as a one-
stop virtual centre for all fintech related matters and with the explicit task of
promoting Singapore as a fintech hub (MAS 2017b).
While fintech is a global movement that has gained significant traction in
recent years, there are different drivers in different geographical markets
(Gnirck and Visser 2016). In developed markets, such as the United States
and Europe, fintech comes from the basis of improving efficiency, reducing
transaction costs, and adding value, while fintech in developing economies
tends to be driven by other critical needs such as financial inclusion and
access to business working capital (building on earlier history of micro-
lending programmes). Given that there is a healthy mix of developed and
developing markets in Asia, Singapore’s combination of financial maturity,
technological infrastructure, and sound regulatory framework makes it an
ideal launch pad for fintech companies tapping into Singapore’s agglomer-
ation of funds and expertise while reaching out to larger potential markets in
the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. A key driver
of fintech in Singapore is the strong support of entrepreneurship and innov-
ation by government-linked organizations. The FinTech Office, for example, is
coordinated by the MAS, EDB, SPRING Singapore,8 and Info-communications
8 SPRING Singapore is an agency under the Ministry of Trade and Industry responsible for
grooming Singaporean enterprises.
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Table 8.3. Grants and schemes available for setting up fintech business in Singapore
Grant/Scheme [Administrator] Description
Startup SG Accelerator
[SPRING Singapore, Startup SG]
• Startup SG Accelerator supports partners, primarily
incubators and accelerators, in strategic growth sectors
that take on the role of catalysing growth opportunities for
high potential start-ups through their programmes,
mentorship, and provision of resources.
• Startup SG Accelerator will provide funding and non-
financial support for these partners to further enhance their
programmes and expertise in nurturing successful start-
ups.
Startup SG Equity
[SPRING Singapore, Startup SG]
• As part of the Startup SG Equity scheme, government will
co-invest with independent, qualified third-party investors
into a start-up. This scheme aims to stimulate private-sector
investments into innovative, Singapore-based technology
start-ups with intellectual property and global market
potential.
Startup SG Founder
[SPRING Singapore, Startup SG]
• Startup SG Founder provides mentorship support and a
start-up capital grant to first-time entrepreneurs with
innovative business concepts. The scheme provides up to
$30,000 by matching $3 to every $1 raised by the
entrepreneur.
• SPRING will fund the start-ups through Accredited Mentor
Partners (‘AMPs’). These appointed partners will select
applicants based on the uniqueness of business concept,
feasibility of business model, strength of management
team, and potential market value. Upon successful
application, the AMP will assist the start-ups with advice,
learning programmes, and networking contacts.
• The AMP will decide on appropriate milestones together
with the applicant. Their recommended application and
milestones will be surfaced to SPRING for vetting and
approval. The grant will be disbursed in two tranches based
on agreed project milestones over twelve months.
Startup SG Talent [T-UP, STP] • Startup SG Talent fosters a more conducive environment
for promising global talent to set up innovative businesses
in Singapore. Schemes under this pillar include:
(a) EntrePass, which allows eligible foreigners to start and
operate a new business in Singapore
(b) T-Up, which allows businesses to access the pool of
talent from A*STAR’s Research Institutes and build in-
house R&D capabilities in their business operations
(c) SME Talent Programme (STP) Internship, which will
facilitate internship matching between students and
technology-based local start-ups.
Startup SG Tech [SPRING Singapore,
Startup SG]
• Startup SG Tech is a competitive grant in which proposals
are evaluated based on both technical and commercial
merits by a team of reviewers, and the best are funded.
Applicants may apply for either the Proof Of Concept
(POC) grant or the Proof Of Value (POV) grant, depending
on the stage of development of the technology or solution/
concept.
(continued )
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MediaDevelopmentAuthority. Table 8.3 showsvarious government grants and
schemes available for supporting fintech companies in Singapore. Other organ-
izations such as International Enterprise Singapore (IE Singapore) have also
been active in facilitating Singapore companies in their internationalization
efforts, including fintech companies.
The proactive stance of Singapore’s financial regulator is also reflected in the
establishment of a special sandbox environment for fintech companies as a
way to delicately manage the tension between innovation and regulatory
requirements (see Figure 8.5). State support has also been directed at organiz-
ing fintech industry conventions as platforms for pitching sessions, network-
ing events, talent recruitment, and bringing together start-ups, incubators,
and investors searching for opportunities and innovation.
8.5 Conclusion
The development of Singapore as a financial centre has a relatively short
history compared to other IFCs of similar standing. Its rapid growth, especially







• The Capabilities Development Grant (CDG) is a financial
assistance programme designed to help SMEs build their
capabilities across ten key business areas. SMEs can use the
CDG to defray up to 70 per cent of qualifying project costs
(e.g. consultancy, training, certification, equipment, and
software costs) for upgrading initiatives in areas like
increasing productivity, process improvement, product
development, and market access.
Financial Sector Technology and
Innovation (FSTI) [MAS]
• The FSTI scheme was launched to provide support for the
creation of a vibrant ecosystem for innovation. MAS has
committed SG$225 million over a five-year period, for the
following four purposes:
(a) Innovation Centres: To attract financial institutions to
set up their innovation labs in Singapore;
(b) Institution-level projects: To catalyse the development of
innovation solutions that have the potential to promote
growth efficiency or competitiveness;
(c) Industry-wide projects: To support the building of
industry-wide technology infrastructure or utility that
is required for the delivery of new, integrated services;
(d) POC scheme: The POC scheme provides support to
both FIs and non-FIs for early-stage development of
innovative projects in the industry.
Source: Author, based on data from MAS (2017c)
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markets and institutions, and increased prominence and participation in
global and regional financial governing bodies, has mirrored the intense
industrialization of other sectors of its economy since independence. The
‘Big Bang’ reforms starting in the late 1990s and transformations in the
banking landscape in the 2000s led to the proliferation of industry players
and new consumer markets. Singapore has also developed a growing reputa-
tion as a wealth management centre and private banking centre. High net
worth individuals choose Singapore for their private banking needs due to
strong fundamentals such as economic and political stability, high regulatory
standards, a robust legal framework, and a critical mass of financial players
offering ready access to global and regional financial markets. Through the
development of new financial markets in terms of IBF and offshore RMB
products and services, Singapore is also creatingmarket niches for itself within
global financial networks. The recent but aggressive foray into fintech reflects
the consistent efforts of state agencies, financial institutions, and related eco-
nomic sectors towards product innovation and staying ahead of the curve in a
rapidly changing global financial landscape.
Throughout the developments detailed in this chapter, the state has clearly
played a vital role in Singapore’s development as an IFC. The role of the
developmental states in shaping East Asian economies has been well docu-
mented (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Johnson 1995), referring to the core
idea that the productive structure of a nation could be improved as a result of
active economic policy. This includes identifying economic activities that are
deemed more conducive to generating economic growth, tight relationships
between the state and business sectors to facilitate policy shifts, and

















































Figure 8.5. Examples of flexibility around regulatory requirements for the fintech
sandbox
Source: Author, based on data from MAS (2016).
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implementing policies designed to distort price structures and other market
signals (e.g. through selective tariffs, subsidies, and access to finance) in order
to induce changes in the pace and direction of capital accumulation. Much of
the literature on developmental states in East Asia has focused on strategic
investments in manufacturing and high-tech sectors, but the banking and
finance sector is also clearly important in economic development strategies—
as seen in the case of Singapore. This calls for a more systematic analysis of the
state in terms of its functions, roles, and institutions in shaping firm behav-
iour and activities within the context of economic development strategies. In
this case, focusing on how the development of financial markets and financial
firms have become increasingly important to economic development policies
brings into question the ways in which we should consider the state–firm
nexus in finance and implications for capitalist dynamics (Lai and Daniels
2017). The flurry of bank bailouts and nationalization of financial institutions
(in effect, if not in name) in the United States and Europe following the 2008
Global Financial Crisis has certainly demonstrated the vital role of the state in
finance. More recently, the events of Brexit have also triggered heated debates,
as supporters of the ‘Leave’ campaign proposed a vision of ‘Singapore-on-
Thames’, with Brexit offering an opportunity to recast the City of London as
an agile, low-regulation hub for global capital, defined by a unilateral free-
trade approach and low-tax regime. Although this proposal has already been
met with scepticism from the finance sector and downright hostility from EU
leaders, it highlights the need for a rethinking of the state–finance nexus in
terms of how we analyse IFC development as being market-led, state-led, or
some shifting configuration that is sensitive to temporal-spatial dynamics.
In terms of future development, Singapore’s long-standing rivalry with
Hong Kong as IFCs, discussed also by David Meyer in Chapter 7 of this book,
will probably continue to dominate business headlines and the attention of
policymakers in both economies, as they are both positioned as the premier
financial hubs of the fastest-growing economic region in the next few decades.
In terms of practice, firms in Singapore and Hong Kong have distinctive
specialization in geographical and business segments. While Hong Kong
benefits from its special status and close economic ties to the enormous
economy of mainland China (with some limited coverage of other East
Asian economies such as South Korea and Taiwan), Singapore is much better
positioned for the diverse and fast-growing economies of southeast Asia and
the other Asian giant—India. In terms of business segments, Hong Kong has a
much larger equity capital market while Singapore leads in terms of foreign
exchange, interest rates derivatives, and insurance business. Both financial
centres, therefore, are necessary for comprehensive coverage in the control
and coordination of regional economic activities for both financial and non-
financial firms in Asia.
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Developments in fintech, however, could introduce new opportunities and
dynamics for financial centre development in Asia. Both Singapore and Hong
Kong have clear ambitions to become the region’s leading fintech hub.
Will fintech reshape financial ecologies in ways that move Hong Kong and
Singapore into different tiers or realms of products and services? On the one
hand, Singapore’s combination of financial maturity, technological infra-
structure, and sound regulatory framework makes it an ideal launch pad for
fintech companies tapping into Singapore’s agglomeration of funds and
expertise while reaching out to larger potential markets in the region such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and India. It also has a more estab-
lished knowledge economy in advanced manufacturing, systems science, IT,
andmedia and related innovative sectors that arguably provides a more robust
ecosystem to support economic innovation. On the other hand, Hong Kong
has the advantage of the enormous mainland Chinese market, which already
has a substantial pool of expertise and capital with rise of fintech giants such
as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent. On a larger scale, how might the rise of Asian
fintech reshape structures of power and hegemony for global finance if new
forms of financial products, services, structures, and organizations emerging
from Asia acquire particular forms of power over certain markets and systems?
This is especially pertinent given that fintech has the potential to reshape
existing divisions between production, finance, and consumption through
new modes of production and service delivery in ways that might leapfrog or
bypass existing firms or structures, which tends to be dominated by Anglo-
American firms and institutions at present.
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